On the morning of 1 March 1954, the United States detonated a thermonuclear weapon named BRAVO at its proving grounds on the Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands.' Within one minute, this bomb produced a huge fireball, created a massive crater in the coral reef, and stripped the nearby islands of all vegetation. The energy released by the explosion was equivalent to 15 million tons of TNT.2 BRAVO is significant to the history of American-East Asian relations for a number of reasons. First, it was the largest thermonuclear test ever carried out by the United States.3 One thousand times more
powerful than the atomic bomb that leveled Hiroshima, BRAVO released an unprecedented amount of radioactivity into the atmosphere. 4 Second, new information suggests that the immediate and long-term effects of the explosion were more destructive than previously acknowledged by the U.S. government. In addition to the environmental damage caused by BRAVO, twenty-three Japanese fishermen, and hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Marshallese were seriously harmed by the shot. Third, the BRAVO incident reveals much about U.S. foreign policy objectives during the Cold War. In the race against the Soviet Union for nuclear supremacy, the protection of the Marshallese and Japanese was not a high priority for American decision-makers. A central assumption behind the explosion was that U.S. national security was more important than the health and safety of the peoples living and working near the proving grounds. Fourth, BRAVO illustrates the growing influence of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in the Eisenhower administration. The agency was responsible not only for conducting the test, but also for developing various public relations strategies to protect the U.S. nuclear program in the Pacific. In cooperation with the State Department and other bureaucracies, the AEC downplayed the destruction caused by the explosion; it also provided misleading information about the effects of the blast. Although these tactics helped the Eisenhower administration maintain domestic support for the testing program, they contributed to serious strains in U.S. relations with Japan and the Marshall Islands. In addition, these public relations ploys made it very difficult for the peoples of the Pacific to gain recognition for their plight and compensation for the damage caused by BRAVO.
Despite its significance, this test has not been the subject of much historical inquiry. In his early work, Blowing on the Wind, Robert Divine analyses the public debate that took place in the United States over nuclear testing during the years from 1954 to 1960. In the background chapter to this book, Divine includes some information about BRAVO and its effects. At the time that he was writing, however, most of the relevant official documents remained classified and he relied largely on published books, journal articles, and newspapers. ' The BRAVO test is discussed briefly in several other works 6 but only one paper by Roger Dingman, entitled "Alliance in Crisis," fo-
